niyogā anāgatārammaṇā natthīti "There are no [consciousness states] that exclusively have future objects" means niyamena invariably/certainly pāṭiyekkaṃ separately/distinctly anāgatārammaṇaṃ nāma what is called "having future objects" cittaṃ consciousness natthi does not exist.

---

niyogā In the sense of "hi" (because) in the sma-vibhatti, to show the reason, it is explained as "niyamena" (certainly). Another way: niyogā + yesaṃ + atthīti niyogā phenomena that are always associated with future objects. This latter method is one way the commentary explains it, as interpreted by the sub-commentary. [niyogāti niyogato, niyoga vanto vā niyogā, niyatāti atthā - sub-commentary.]

Moreover, this present object is threefold: momentary-present (khaṇapaccuppannaṃ), continuity-present (santatipaccuppannaṃ), and period-present (addhāpaccuppannaṃ).

[Commentary: "Santati" and "addhāpaccuppannaṃ" - The sequence of material and mental phenomena is called "santati" (continuity). The one-time or two-time sequence of these material and mental phenomena is called continuity-present. A lifetime period is called "addhā" (period), hence period-present means the present of one lifetime period.]

However, as long as that object becomes clear, during this interval, the rounds of material and mental continuity that occur should be understood as one or two continuity-rounds.

[Commentary explains: "Etthantare... vārā" - From the time when the object is unclear until it becomes clear is called "etthantare" (in this interval). During this time, the clarity of objects varies - for some it's quick, for others slow. For the quick ones, one round of material-mental continuity is called "eka-santati-vāra"; for the slow ones, two rounds is called "dvi-santati-vāra". This represents the Paṭṭhāna-commentary scholars' explanation of continuity-present. The Saṃyutta-commentary scholars follow the original commentary...]

However, the Saṃyutta-commentary scholars say differently: Having distinguished two continuities - material continuity and mental continuity - they say:

Like a person who has stepped on water - as long as the water-traces from stepping on the shore do not become clear (remain disturbed), for that entire period;

Like a person who has come from a long journey - as long as the heat condition in the body does not subside, for that entire period;

Like a person who has come from the sun and entered a room - as long as the darkness condition does not disappear, for that entire period;

Like a person who has contemplated meditation objects inside a room during daytime, then opened the window and looked out - as long as the trembling condition of the eyes does not subside, for that entire period - this is called material continuity.

yaṃ Referring to that addhāpaccuppanna, sandhāya in the Bhaddekarattasutta, yo cāvuso, pe, saṃhīratīti - "O friends... is attracted" - this was vuttaṃ spoken by (āyasmātā mahākaccānattherena) the Venerable Elder Mahākaccāna: [āvuso "O friends, yoca mano whatever mind and yeca dhammā whatever mental objects santi etaṃubhayaṃ exist - both of these, mind and mental objects, are paccuppannaṃ the addhāpaccuppanna."

[Commentary note: In the Bhaddekarattasutta in the Uparipannāsa by Elder Mahākaccāna referring to the Bhaddekarattasutta, in that sutta "yo cāpi" does not include "ayaṃ", and after "ye ca dhammā" there is no "sampayuttāpada" - those dhammā are not associated mental factors but only mental objects. Mind means bhavaṅga-citta, dhammā means the mental object of the six sense-doors. The commentary states: "ubhayametaṃ paccuppannaṃ" means "addhā paccuppannaṃ hontaṃ" as the sub-commentary explains, which appears to clarify the meaning. According to viññāṇa, it is called "nikanti-viññāṇa" in that commentary.]

tasmiṃ paccuppanne In that present mind and mental objects, chandarāgapaṭibaddhaṃ viññāṇaṃ consciousness bound with desire and attachment hoti exists. Due to consciousness being chandarāgapaṭibaddhattā bound with desire and attachment, it abhinandati delights excessively in taṃ those mind and mental objects. When abhinandanto delighting excessively in taṃ those mind and mental objects, in paccuppannesu dhammesu present phenomena, saṃhīrati craving and wrong views attract [the person].

[Commentary note: saṃhīrati - with the prefix saṃ-, from the root har- (to take/carry), with the suffix -ti. This refers to the object, meaning "to take away." According to the Yogavibhāga of the Moggallāna Khaṇḍaka (123rd) sutta, this becomes kamma-rūpa form. The Nissaya explains it as "saṃhīratīti taṇhādiṭṭhibhinandanāti ākaḍḍīyati" - "saṃhīrati means being drawn by craving and wrong views" - Ṭīkā.]

Because the consciousness of both the possessor of supernormal powers (iddhimassa) with the knowledge of others’ minds and of another person arises simultaneously in a single moment, they say so.

Here it is said, “The consciousness of both the possessor of the knowledge of others’ minds and another person arises simultaneously.”

Later it is said, “It is known in the moment of subsistence (ṭhitikkhaṇa) or dissolution (bhaṅgakkhaṇa),” but the commentary rejects this as inconsistent.

Why? Because the consciousness arising in those two moments (subsistence or dissolution) cannot be simultaneous with another’s consciousness, as explained.

Furthermore, the consciousness arising at the moment of subsistence or dissolution of another’s consciousness takes as its object partly a present consciousness (not yet ceased) and partly a past consciousness (already ceased), and thus it does not solely take the present consciousness as its object.

As it is said, “Thus, it partly takes a past object,” according to the commentary.

And this is the simile of those teachers:

Just as when a handful of flowers is thrown into the sky, one flower inevitably pierces the stalk of another flower,

or as one stalk pierces another stalk, so too,

by the power of the aggregate, one says, “I will know the consciousness of another person.”

When reflecting on the consciousness of many people, one inevitably knows the consciousness of a single person with one consciousness,

either in the moment of arising (uppādakkhaṇa), subsistence (ṭhitikkhaṇa), or dissolution (bhaṅgakkhaṇa), and thus it is known.

This is the simile of those teachers, they say.

However, that statement is rejected in the commentaries or in the context of sound reasoning,

even if one reflects for a hundred years or a thousand years,

because the consciousness with which one reflects and the consciousness with which one knows cannot coexist simultaneously,

and because they cannot arise simultaneously, and due to the fault of having different objects in places other than the path process (maggavīthi) or fruition process (phalavīthi), it is improper.

Thus, it has been rejected in the ancient commentaries.

In undesirable places (i.e., outside the path and fruition processes), reflection (āvajjana) takes conditioned phenomena (tebhūmaka-saṅkhāra) as its object, and the path and fruition take Nibbāna as their object, so having different objects is appropriate.

But in other cases, having different objects is not appropriate.

By virtue of the duration present, they have the same object because they take the present as their object.

The statement “By virtue of the duration present (addhāpaccuppanna) as an object” suggests that the duration present lasts only for the duration of one cognitive process (javanavīthi). However, since it is later said that “even the continuity present (santatipaccuppanna) falls within the duration present,” it should be understood that the duration present encompasses an entire lifetime, as explained earlier in the Bhaddekaratta Sutta.

In the context of the fourth jhāna, such as in the Sarvāstivāda teaching, after explaining the knowledge of others’ minds (cetopariyañāṇa) as related to the fourth jhāna, it is stated that the knowledge of past lives (pubbenivāsañāṇa) and the fourth jhāna are mentioned to indicate the knowledge of past lives.

The knowledge of past lives in the fourth jhāna (pubbenivāsañāṇacatutthaṃ) has an object that cannot be classified as past, future, or present when recalling names and clans in sequence or when reflecting on the object of Nibbāna or the sign of a meditation subject (kasiṇa).

In other cases, when recalling or reflecting on the remaining phenomena, it has only a past object (atītārammaṇa).

Among these knowledges, both the knowledge of past lives (pubbenivāsañāṇa) and the knowledge of others’ minds (cetopariyañāṇa) have past objects, although there is a distinction.

However, in the case of the knowledge of past lives, there is no phenomenon that is not an object, whether it be past aggregates (khandhas) or concepts like names and clans connected to the aggregates.

Indeed, that knowledge of others’ minds does not know aggregates or concepts like names and clans connected to aggregates, apart from consciousness.

However, because it knows consciousness associated with the path (magga), it is said, by way of expression (pariyāyato), to have the path as its object, meaning that knowing consciousness implies knowing the path associated with it.

However, apart from the method of the commentaries, according to the Pāli Canon, it is stated in the Paṭṭhāna that wholesome aggregates serve as a condition for the knowledge of supernormal powers (iddhividhañāṇa) and the knowledge of the future (anāgataṃsañāṇa) by way of object condition. Therefore, all four aggregates are the objects of the knowledge of others’ minds and the knowledge of beings’ destinies according to their actions.

According to the commentary method, it is said that “the knowledge of others’ minds takes only consciousness (viññāṇakkhandha) as its object, and the knowledge of beings’ destinies according to their actions takes only volition (cetanā), a formation aggregate (saṅkhārakkhandha), as its object.” Therefore, according to the Pāli Canon method, it is said in a different way that all four aggregates are taken as objects, and there is no disagreement regarding the objects of the three knowledges, such as the knowledge of past lives.

[Having explained the Past-Object Triad, in order to explain the Internal Triad, he states "ajjhattattike" and so on]

In ajjhattatike (the internal triad), anindriya... pe... bahiddhāti (not bound with faculty... [abbreviated]... external) — idaṃ (this statement of these two phenomena) (is stated - "vuttaṃ" connects here) vā (or) (connects with "na hoti" - is not).

(This refers to form not bound with faculty and to nibbāna.)

Indriyabaddhaṃ (form bound with faculty) — form bound with the life faculty, the form of living beings, parapuggalasantāne (in the continuum of another person) bahiddhāti (as "bahiddhā" - external) vuccamānampi (even though it is called) — however, tassa (of that form not bound with faculty) attano santāna pariyāpannattā (because of being included in one's own continuum) niyakajjhattaṃ hoti yathā (just as it becomes niyakajjhatta - one's own internal), evaṃ (similarly) yena kenaci pariyāyena (by any particular way/reason whatsoever) ajjhattaṃ na hoti (it cannot be internal). Iti (Therefore) niyakajjhattapariyāyassa abhāvena (because of the absence of a reason for being niyakajjhatta) bahiddhāti vuttaṃ (it is stated as "bahiddhā" - external). Niyakajjhattamattassa asambhavato (because of the impossibility of being merely niyakajjhatta) (bahiddhāti na vuttaṃ) ([it is] not [that it is not] stated as "bahiddhā").

---

[Note: Na niyaka pe, asambhavato]

[The word "matta" (mere/only) has a limiting meaning.]

In the Internal-Object Triad, the external phenomena stated under "bahiddhārammaṇā" (external objects) receive the name "bahiddhā" when they do not occur in one's own continuum, but when they do occur in one's own continuum, they should still have the name "niyakajjhattā" (one's own internal).

Thus, the collection of mental-material phenomena that are merely not fit to be niyakajjhatta by circumstance is called "niyakajjhattamatta asambhava" (impossibility of being merely niyakajjhatta).

pana (however) niyakajjhattamattassa (of that which is merely one's own internal, arising in dependence on oneself) asambhavamattaṃ (the very state of being impossible/unfitting) sandhāya (with reference to) ajjhattārammaṇattike (in the Internal-Object Triad) bahiddhārammaṇatā (the state of being an external object) vuttā (is stated [by the Buddha]).

---

[Having explained the Internal Triad, in order to explain how the base of nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana) becomes a "not-to-be-spoken-of object" (na vattabbārammaṇa) in the Internal-Object Triad, he states "ajjhattadhammā paggahamattato ca" (internal phenomena, and because of mere withdrawal) and so on.]

ca (and) ajjhattadhammāpagamamattato (because of the mere absence of internal phenomena) ākiñcaññāyatanārammaṇassa (of the concept of nothingness which is the object of the base of nothingness) ajjhattabhāvampi (the state of being internal) bahiddhābhāvampi (and the state of being external) ajjhattabahiddhābhāvampi (and [the state of being] both internal and external) ananujānitvā (not permitting) ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ... pe... ramaṇanti (the base of nothingness... [abbreviated]... delighting) pītiādi (joy and so on, such words) bhagavato vuttaṃ ([the Blessed One] stated).

---

[Note: Ajjhattadhammā... pe... vuttaṃ]

This is the explanation of the Pali passage "ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ... pe... bahiddhā ramaṇanti" (the base of nothingness... [abbreviated]... external... delighting). The consciousness of the base of nothingness takes as object the concept of nothingness (natthībhāvapaññatti). That concept of nothingness is precisely the absence of internal phenomena (ajjhattadhammāpagama), namely [the absence of] the first formless consciousness.

Therefore, because that concept of nothingness is not an internal phenomenon, it cannot be called an internal object. Because it arises in dependence on the internal first formless consciousness, it also cannot be called merely external.

Therefore, the jhāna that takes that object as its object is stated [by the Blessed One] as "na vattabbaṃ ajjhattārammaṇaṃ" (not to be spoken of as having an internal object) and so on.

In the statement “tattha … na vattabbaṃ ajjhattārammaṇanti pi … etc.”,

it is not only (kevalaṃ) the mere adverting (āvajjana) and so forth [that are meant];

rather, only that very base of nothing-whatsoever (tadeva ākiñcaññāyatana-jhāna)

is not an object that should be spoken of (na vattabbārammaṇaṃ) as “internal” and so forth.

It is not [yet] the case [that nothing else is];

on the contrary (pana),

even the adverting (āvajjanampi) to that base of nothing-whatsoever,

and the preparatory minds of access concentration etc. (upacāracittānipi),

and the reviewing minds (paccavekkhaṇacittānipi) that take as object that very “absence-concept” (n’atthi-bhāva-paññatti),

and even unwholesome minds (akusalacittānipi) that arise through relishing etc. (assādanādivasena) that very same object –

all these are indeed objects that should not be spoken of (na vattabbārammaṇāneva honti).

---

“tattha na kevalaṃ … pe … na vuttāni”

That is to say: not only the base of nothing-whatsoever itself,

but also the adverting that precedes that jhāna-process which takes the absence-concept as object,

the access-jhāna minds such as preparatory concentration (parikamma etc.),

and the reviewing-process minds that come after those jhānas –

all these are solely objects that should not be spoken of (na vattabbārammaṇā).

However, those [minds] are not taught separately

because, when the base of nothing-whatsoever is spoken of,

they are (inevitably) included as its retinue,

and they have already been taught [together with it].

---

In the passage "The base of nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana) is not to be stated as having an internal object, etc.," it is not merely the ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna alone (without adverting, etc.) that has an object not to be stated as internal, etc. Rather, the adverting of that ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna, the proximate jhāna consciousness states like parikamma, the reviewing consciousness states regarding that object of the nothingness-concept (natthipabhāva-paññatti), and even the unwholesome consciousness states that arise through the power of relishing, etc., that same nothingness-concept object—all these have 'not-to-be-stated objects.'

But (pana) although those [minds] – adverting etc. – are solely objects that should not be spoken of,

when that base of nothing-whatsoever is spoken of (tasmiṃ vutte),

they are already considered as having been spoken of (vuttāneva honti).

Therefore (iti), they are not taught separately (visuṃ na vuttāni).

---

Although these adverting consciousness states, etc., are all 'not-to-be-stated objects,' when that ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna is stated directly, they are already stated. Therefore, they need not be stated separately.

How (kathaṃ) are they “already spoken of” (vuttāneva honti)?

This is the question.

The answer is (hi):

This base of nothing-whatsoever (etaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ),

and whatever mind arises (yaṃ … pavattaṃ) by way of adverting, access, etc. (āvajjana-upacārādivasena)

that is preliminary (purecārikaṃ) to it –

that mind would have the very same object (ekārammaṇaṃ bhaveyya) together with this base of nothing-whatsoever.

---

This ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna and whatever consciousness precedes it as adverting, proximate jhāna, etc., have the same object together with that jhāna.

And all that – the base of nothing-whatsoever together with all those minds –

in the section on past objects (atītārammaṇattike),

was spoken of thus: “kāmāvacara-kusala, … pe … catuttha-jjhānanti”

and in the explanation of why those [minds] arising (etesaṃ cittuppādānaṃ)

are objects that should not be spoken of (na vattabbārammaṇa-bhāvassa),

it was allowed (anuññātattā) by the method beginning “siyā … pe … ramaṇātipi ti ādinā”.

Therefore, because the state of being an object that should not be spoken of

has been permitted (though not directly stated),

and because it has been expressed (vacanato ca)

that the base of nothing-whatsoever is unconditionally (ekantena)

an object that should not be spoken of –

“ākiñcaññā … pe … ramaṇātipi ti” –

therefore it is taught (vuttaṃ) that it is an object that should not be spoken of:

“na vattabbārammaṇanti”.

---

“etaṃ hi … pe … vuttaṃ”

For in the ṭīkā it is indicated by the words “ākiñcaññāyatanādi”,

therefore, according to “all that” (taṃ sabbaṃ),

one must take the base of nothing-whatsoever together with adverting and all the other minds.

That is why [the sub-commentator] inserted “atthi” and gave the meaning accordingly.

In the syntactic connection, however, “etaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ” is taken together with “yaṃ”

and construed with “bhaveyya”.

Consider the words “tena saha” [“together with that”].

When it says that “taṃ sabbaṃ” is construed in “vuttaṃ” in the past-object section,

although it uses the word “vuttaṃ” (“spoken”),

it does not mean directly spoken;

rather, by way of permission (anuññātattā) and by way of the wording (vacanato),

it means “has been made clear” or “has been established”.

– Thus the ṭīkā.

Now (idāni), although this base of nothing-whatsoever

is spoken of in the internal-object section (ajjhattārammaṇattike)

as a single item (ekaṃ), without including adverting etc.,

nevertheless (vā … thaṃ),

because below, in the past-object section (heṭṭhā atītārammaṇattike),

referring also to the fact of having the same object together with it (ekārammaṇabhāvampi sandhāya),

the state of being objects that should not be spoken of

was taught for sense-sphere wholesome [minds] etc. (kāmāvacara-kusalādīnaṃ na vattabbārammaṇatā vuttā),

therefore, here too in the internal-object section (idhāpi),

it shows (dīpeti) the state of those [sense-sphere wholesome minds etc.]

being objects that should not be spoken of (tesaṃ na vattabbārammaṇabhāvaṃ).

---

Now, even though that ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna alone (without adverting, etc.) is stated as one in the internal-object-triad, because below in the past-object-triad, taking into account also the quality of having the same object together with that ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna, the quality of having 'not-to-be-stated objects' was stated for sense-sphere wholesome, etc. [the term "sense-sphere wholesome, etc." refers to adverting, etc.], therefore here too in the internal-object-triad, it shows the quality of having 'not-to-be-stated objects' for those sense-sphere wholesome, etc.

For (hi), when they have the same object together with this base of nothing-whatsoever (tena saha ekārammaṇānaṃ),

in the case of mahā-kusala and other [higher] minds

being objects that should not be spoken of,

where would there be any obstruction (ko santarāyo)?

---

When that ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna is stated, what obstacle is there for the mahā-kusala consciousness states, etc., that have the same object with it, being 'not-to-be-stated objects'?

Thus (evaṃ), by this method that has been explained,

when that base of nothing-whatsoever is spoken of,

those [mahā-kusala etc. minds] are indeed already spoken of (vuttāneva honti).

This is what should be understood.

[The ṭīkā master will probably omit this sentence.]

---

In this manner, when that ākiñcaññāyatana jhāna is stated directly, those mahā-kusala consciousness states, etc., should be understood as already stated.

Here in the internal-object section (ettha ajjhattārammaṇattike),

the rest of the terms are perfectly clear from the Pāli text itself (pāḷito uttānameva).

pana (continuing from the previous section):

In the earlier nissaya, the word pana is used in the sense of “and furthermore” or “besides that”.

In the classification of objects (ārammaṇa-vibhāge), the definitive decision (vinicchayo) should first be understood thus:

The base of infinite consciousness (viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ) and the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ) that were previously specified (niddiṭṭhaṃ),

when they arise as wholesome-resultant (kusala-vipāka) or functional (kiriya),

take as their object the lower attainment (heṭṭhimā samāpatti) that belongs to their own mental continuum (attano santāna-sambandhaṃ).

Therefore, their being internal objects (ajjhattārammaṇatā) is to be understood.

(This meaning is exactly the same as the Saṅgaha statement: “Among the immaterial [jhānas], the second and the fourth are objects that are ‘exalted’ (mahaggatārammaṇāni)”. The explanations that follow will elaborate this very same point in detail. Commentators also customarily explain the Saṅgaha passages on the basis of this expanded meaning.)

ca (furthermore):

Among these wholesome, resultant, and functional [jhānas],

the functional base of infinite space (kiriya ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ) serves as object only for the functional base of infinite consciousness (kiriya-viññāṇañcāyatanasseva ārammaṇaṃ hoti);

it does not serve as object for the wholesome or resultant base of infinite consciousness.

Because, in the continuum of an arahant who possesses the functional base of infinite space (ākāsānañcāyatana-kiriya-samaṅgino),

there exists neither a wholesome nor a resultant base of infinite consciousness (kusalassa vā vipākassa vā viññāṇañcāyatanassa abhāvato).

pana (on the other hand):

The wholesome base of infinite space (kusalaṃ ākāsānañcāyatanam) serves as object for all three types of base of infinite consciousness — wholesome, resultant, and functional (tiṇṇampi … ārammaṇaṃ hoti).

Why?

Because a person who has produced the wholesome base of infinite space and remains in it (ākāsānañcāyatanakusalaṃ nibbattetvā ṭhitassa)

can still give rise above it (tato uddhaṃ) to the base of infinite consciousness in any of its three forms (tividhassapi viññāṇañcāyatanassa uppatti-sambhavato).

pana (again):

The resultant base of infinite space (vipākaṃ ākāsānañcāyatanam) does not serve as object for any base of infinite consciousness at all (kassaci … ārammaṇaṃ na hoti).

Why?

Because, after emerging (vuṭṭhahitvā) from a resultant jhāna — whether at rebirth-linking, life-continuum, or death —

there is no possibility of directing the mind of cultivation (bhāvanā-citta) toward the base of infinite consciousness (abhinīhāra-asambhavato).

As for all the jhānas beginning with the rūpāvacara set of four (rūpāvacara-catukka-jhānāni pe … dīnaṃ),

because their objects — the earth-kasiṇa etc. — are external by nature (niyaka-jjhattato bahiddhā-bhāvena bahiddhā-bhūtāni),

they arise in dependence on those external objects (pathavīkasiṇādīni ārabbha pavattito).

Therefore, their being external objects (bahiddhārammaṇatā) is to be understood.

In the textual passage “sabbeva … pe … catutthajjhānanti ettha”,

first (tāva), among the previously mentioned (niddiṭṭhā) wholesome etc. states,

the four knowledge-associated mind-arising (ñāṇasampayutta-cittuppādā)

that review one’s own aggregates etc. (attano khandhādīni paccavekkhantassa)

are internal objects (ajjhattārammaṇā honti) in the continuum of that person.

---

“tipi dhassāpi … pe … sambhavato”

That is:

When a worldling or a trainee (puthujjana-sekha) has attained the base of infinite space and then continues to cultivate and attains the base of infinite consciousness,

that (resultant or wholesome) base of infinite consciousness takes the wholesome base of infinite space as its object.

When that same person, at death, is reborn with the resultant base of infinite consciousness (at rebirth-linking, life-continent, or death-moment), that resultant jhāna also takes the wholesome base of infinite space as its object.

When an arahant who previously attained the base of infinite space as a worldling or trainee later attains the base of infinite consciousness,

that (functional) base of infinite consciousness takes the wholesome base of infinite space as its object.

When an arahant who has already become an arahant attains the base of infinite space (whether functional or after entering it), and then cultivates the base of infinite consciousness,

that functional base of infinite consciousness takes the functional base of infinite space as its object.

This is how it should be understood.

When those [same four knowledge-associated minds] review another person’s aggregates etc. (paresaṃ khandhādi-paccavekkhaṇe),

or when they review concepts or Nibbāna (paṇṇatti-nibbāna-paccavekkhaṇe ca),

they are external objects (bahiddhārammaṇā honti).

When they arise by way of both (tadubhayavasena) —

i.e., reviewing both one’s own and another’s aggregates etc. —

they are internal-and-external objects (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā honti).

For, apart from mere reviewing of aggregates etc. or reviewing of concepts (kevalaṃ khandhādi-paccavekkhaṇa-paṇṇatti-paccavekkhaṇaṃ-mattakaṃ),

those knowledge-dissociated minds do not review Nibbāna at all (tesaṃ nibbāna-paccavekkhaṇaṃ natthi).

The four view-associated unwholesome minds (akusalato diṭṭhigata-sampayutta-cittuppādā)

that arise relishing, delighting in, or wrongly clinging to one’s own aggregates etc. (attano khandhādīnaṃ assādanā … pe … kāle)

are internal objects (ajjhattārammaṇā honti).

When they similarly arise relishing etc. another person’s aggregates etc. (parassa khandhādīsu ceva)

or non-sense-sphere material kasiṇas and concepts (anindriyabaddha-rūpa-kasiṇādīsu ca)

they are external objects (bahiddhārammaṇā honti).

When they arise by way of both (tadubhayavasena) —

i.e., taking both one’s own and another’s aggregates etc. —

they are internal-and-external objects (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā honti).

For, apart from mere relishing and delighting (assādana-abhinandana-mattakaṃ),

those view-dissociated minds do not involve wrong grasping or clinging (tesaṃ parāmāsa-ggahaṇaṃ natthi).

The two aversion-accompanied minds (dvepi paṭighasampayuttā)

that arise with displeasure (domanassitassa) toward one’s own aggregates etc.

are internal objects (ajjhattārammaṇā honti).

When they arise toward another person’s aggregates etc. (parassa khandhādīsu ceva)

or toward non-sense-sphere material forms and concepts (anindriyabaddha-rūpa-paṇṇattīsu ca)

they are external objects (bahiddhārammaṇā honti).

When they arise by way of both —

i.e., generating displeasure toward both one’s own and another’s aggregates etc. —

they are internal-and-external objects (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā honti).

As for the doubt-accompanied and restlessness-accompanied minds (vicikicch’uddhacca-sampayuttānaṃ pi),

when they arise in relation to the previously described kinds of phenomena (vuttapakāresu dhammesu)

by way of doubting or mental agitation/restlessness (vicikicchanaphandanabhāvavasena),

their being internal objects, external objects, or internal-and-external objects (ajjhattādi-ārammaṇatā)

is to be understood in exactly the same way.

The two sets of five consciousnesses (dvepañcaviññāṇāni)

and the three mind-elements (tisso manodhātuyo ca) —

that is, these thirteen types of mind-arising (ime terasa cittuppādā) —

when they arise taking one’s own visible forms, sounds, etc. (attano rūpādīni ārabbha)

are internal objects (ajjhattārammaṇā honti).

When they arise taking another person’s visible forms, sounds, etc. (parassa rūpādīsu)

they are external objects (bahiddhārammaṇā honti).

When they arise by way of both (tadubhayavasena)

they are internal-and-external objects (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā honti).

The joyful ahetuka resultant mind-consciousness element (i.e., the joyful investigating and registration minds – somanassa-santīraṇa and tadārammaṇa)

when arising at the five sense doors by way of investigation and registration (pañcadvāre santīraṇa-tadārammaṇa-vasena)

taking one’s own visible forms etc. (attano pañca rūpādi-dhamme ārabbha),

or when arising at the mind door only by way of registration (manodvāre tadārammaṇa-vaseneva)

taking other sense-sphere phenomena belonging to one’s own continuum (aññepi ajjhattike kāmāvacara-dhamme ārabbha),

are internal objects (ajjhattārammaṇā honti).

When they arise taking phenomena belonging to others (paresaṃ dhammesu)

they are external objects (bahiddhārammaṇā honti).

When they arise by way of both (ubhayavasena)

they are internal-and-external objects (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇā honti).

The same method (eseva nayo) applies also to the two equanimous ahetuka resultant mind-consciousness elements

and the two equanimous investigating minds (upekkhā-sahagata-dhātu-dvayepi).

However (pana), there is this slight distinction:

Apart from merely functioning as rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death-consciousness (kevalaṃ paṭisandhe bhavange cutivasena-mattakaṃ),

these equanimous investigating minds (etā upekkhā-sahagata-santīraṇā)

also arise in happy destinations and woeful destinations alike (sugatiyaṃ duggatiyañca),

and do so by way of rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death-consciousness (paṭisandhi … pe … vasenāpi)

in relation to kamma, kamma-sign, or destiny-sign objects

that are classified as internal, external, or internal-and-external (ajjhattādi-bhedesu kammādīsu pavattanti).

The eight great resultant consciousnesses (aṭṭha mahāvipākacittāni pi)

also follow exactly the same pattern (samāna-gatikāni)

as those two equanimous investigating minds mentioned earlier (etāsaṃ yeva).

However (pana), there is this slight distinction:

Apart from functioning as rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death-consciousness (kevalaṃ paṭisandhi-bhavaṅga-cuti-vasena-mattakaṃ),

these great resultant minds do not arise by way of investigation (santīraṇa-vasena na pavattanti).

They arise only as rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death-consciousness (paṭisandhi-bhavaṅga-cuti-vaseneva),

and they do so only in happy destinations (sugatiyaṃ yeva pavattanti).

The joyful ahetuka functional consciousness

(i.e., the smiling consciousness of the Arahant – somanassa-sahagata ahetuka-kiriya, called hasituppāda)

when it arises at the five sense doors

taking one’s own visible forms, sounds, etc. (attano rūpādīni ārabbha) and producing the mode of great exhilaration or delight (pahaṭṭhākāra-karaṇa-vasena),

is an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇā hoti).

When it arises taking another person’s visible forms, sounds, etc. (parassa rūpādīsu),

it is an external object (bahiddhārammaṇā hoti).

At the mind door,

when the Tathāgata reviews a deed He Himself has just performed in the lifetimes of Jotipāla, King Magha, the ascetic Kaṇha, and so forth (i.e., in the circumstances described in the Ghaṭikāra Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya,

the Maghadeva Sutta of the same collection,

and the Kaṇha Jātaka of the Dasanipāta, etc.),

then that smiling consciousness (hasituppāda-vasena) arises

and is an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇā hoti).

When the smiling consciousness (hasituppāda) arises taking as object

the functional deeds performed by such persons as

Queen Mallikā,

the great minister Santati,

the garland-maker Sumana,

and others of that kind (iti evamādīnaṃ kiriyākaraṇaṃ ārabbha),

it is an external object (bahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

---

[See the story of Queen Mallikā in the Kummāsa-piṇḍi Jātaka,

of the great minister Santati in the Santati-mahāmattavatthu of the Daṇḍa-vagga (Dhammapada Commentary),

and of the garland-maker Sumana in the Sumana-mālākāravatthu of the Bāla-vagga (Dhammapada Commentary).]

The equanimous ahetuka functional mind-consciousness element

(i.e., the mind-door adverting – upekkhā-sahagata ahetuka-kiriya manoviññāṇadhātu, called manodvārāvajjana)

arises at the five sense doors by way of determining (voṭṭhabbana-vasena)

and at the mind door by way of adverting (āvajjana-vasena). In both cases it can be internal, external, or internal-and-external objects (ajjhattādi-ārammaṇā hoti).

The eight great functional consciousnesses (aṭṭha mahākiriyāni)

follow exactly the same pattern as the (eight) wholesome consciousnesses (kusalacitta-gatikā eva).

For (hi), the only slight difference is this:

Apart from the mere fact of the continuum in which they arise (kevalaṃ santāna-tamattakaṃ),

these great functional consciousnesses arise only in the continuum of the arahants (khīṇāsavānaṃ santāne uppajjanti),

whereas the wholesome consciousnesses arise in the continuum of trainees and worldlings (sekkha-puthujjanānaṃ santāne uppajjanti).

This alone (ettakam eva) is the distinguishing factor between these two sets of consciousnesses.

In the classification of objects (ārammaṇa-vibhāga),

the five jhānas beginning with the “universally-present fourth” (sabbatthapādaka-catuttha) and ending with the fifth —

that is, the twelve types of fourth and fifth rūpāvacara jhānas mentioned earlier (vuttappakāre sabbatthapādaka-catutthādīni pañca jhānāni) —

are the only ones that find room (okāsaṃ labhanti) in this present triad of “internal objects” (imasmiṃ tike).

For (hi), these five jhāna-minds

take as their objects the kasiṇa, concepts, the in-and-out-breath sign, etc. (kasiṇa … pe … ramaṇattā),

and for that very reason they are external objects (bahiddhārammaṇāni honti).

The fourth jhāna of psychic power (iddhividha-catutthaṃ)

when, through the power of mind over body (kāyavasena cittaṃ)

or body over mind (cittavasena kāyaṃ vā),

one transforms or bends the body or mind (pariṇāmanakāle),

or when one creates forms such as a boy’s shape, etc. (kumārakavaṇṇādi-nimmānakāle ca),

takes one’s own body-and-mind (sakakāya-cittāni) as object

and is therefore an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When, however, one manifests external objects such as elephants, horses, etc. (bahiddhā hatthi … pe … kāle),

it is an external object (bahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

At the appropriate times, it arises sometimes with respect to the internal continuum (kālena ajjhattaṃ),

sometimes with respect to the external (kālena bahiddhā),

and thus it is also internal-and-external object (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

dibbasota-catutthaṃ

When it hears a sound arising in one’s own belly (attano kucchisaddasavanakāle),

it is an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When it hears another person’s sounds (paresaṃ saddasavanakālena),

it is an external object (bahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When it arises by way of both,

it is internal-and-external object (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

cetopariyañāṇa-catutthaṃ

Because it takes only another person’s mind as object (paresaṃ cittārammaṇato),

it is solely an external object (bahiddhārammaṇam eva hoti).

However (pana),

there is no practical benefit (payojanaṃ natthi)

in knowing one’s own mind with this knowledge (attano cittajānane tena).

Therefore (tasmā),

this knowledge is not an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇaṃ na hoti).

(The ṭīkā adds: “One can already know one’s own mind with mind itself; no supernormal knowledge is required for that.”)

pubbenivāsa-catutthaṃ

When one recollects one’s own aggregates (attano khandhānussaraṇakāle),

it is an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When one recollects another person’s aggregates (parassa khandhe),

non-sensory material forms (anindriyabaddha-rūpaṃ),

and the three kinds of concept (tisso paṇṇattiyo ca) —

i.e., clan, name, and lineage —

it is an external object (bahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When it arises by way of both,

it is internal-and-external object (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

dibbacakkhu-catutthaṃ

When it sees material form located inside one’s own belly or body (attano kucchigatādi-rūpa-dassanākāle),

it is an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When it sees the remaining material forms (avasesa-rūpa-dassanākāle),

it is an external object (bahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When it arises by way of both,

it is internal-and-external object (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

anāgataṃsañāṇa-catutthaṃ

When it recollects one’s own future aggregates (attano anāgata-kkhandhānussaraṇakāle),

it is an internal object (ajjhattārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When it recollects another person’s future aggregates,

non-sensory material forms,

or the three kinds of concept (clan, name, lineage) (parassa anāgata-kkhandhānaṃ vā anindriyabaddhassa rūpassa vā tissannaṃ paṇṇattīnaṃ vā anussaraṇakāle),

it is an external object (bahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

When it arises by way of both,

it is internal-and-external object (ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇaṃ hoti).

As for the base of nothing-whatsoever (ākiñcaññāyatana),

the reason why it is an object that “should not be spoken of” (na vattabbārammaṇatāya kāraṇaṃ)

has already been stated above

(at the beginning of this very internal-object triad:

“simply because the phenomena have departed from the internal” etc.).